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Abstract 
 
Drawing on just-world theory and research into the suppression and justification of 
prejudice, we propose that the use of relative compared to absolute measures of an 
innocent victim’s character enables observers to derogate the victim without transparently 
violating social norms or values proscribing derogation. In Study 1, we found that positive 
feelings expressed toward victims mirrored social norms proscribing negative reactions 
toward them. In Studies 2a, 2b and 3, innocent victims were evaluated more negatively 
when ratings were made using relative (i.e., compared to evaluations of the average student 
or the self) versus absolute scales. In Study 4, this effect of scale type on derogation was 
stronger for people higher in the motivation to avoid prejudiced reactions to victims. 
Relative judgments seem to allow individuals to enact their counter-normative motivation 
to derogate the victim under the cover of ambiguity and ostensibly rationally motivated 
social comparison processes. 
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Derogating Innocent Victims: The Effects of Relative versus Absolute Character Judgments 
One of the most striking of observers’ reactions to undeserved suffering and misfortune is 
the tendency, at times, to derogate the victim’s character (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966; 
Ryan, 1971). The capacity for people to derogate innocent victims is surprising because, by 
commonly accepted conventions and social norms, people ought not to derogate someone 
for negative outcomes brought about by factors beyond their control (Weiner, 1995). One 
explanation for why people might derogate an innocent victim is that doing so enables them 
to maintain a belief in a just world (BJW; Lerner, 1980). According to just-world theory, 
people need to believe that the world is a just and fair place where people get what they 
deserve. Committing to a just-world is functional because it allows people to pursue long-
term goals with confidence (Callan, Harvey, Dawtry, & Sutton, 2013; Hafer & Bègue, 2005). 
Given its functional importance, when the BJW is threatened, such as by witnessing an 
innocent person suffer, people are motivated to engage in behaviors that restore justice, 
such as helping the victim or punishing the perpetrators (for reviews, see Ellard, Harvey, & 
Callan, 2016; Hafer & Begue, 2005). When such means of restoring justice are unavailable or 
too costly, people may instead seek to maintain a perception of deservingness by, for 
example, derogating the victim’s character—in a just-world, bad thing happen only to “bad” 
people. 
 
Social Norms and Reactions to Victims 
 
Although research has shown that innocent victims are sometimes rated less favorably than 
non-victims, derogation rarely manifests as unambiguous, outright negativity. Rather than 
judging a victim as “bad” per se, derogation generally entails judging a victim neutrally, or as 
“good” on average, if somewhat less good than if their suffering were lesser or did not 
occur. Indeed, participants’ judgments of a victim’s character are often quite positive, with 
mean character ratings above scale mid-points often observed across both low and high 
BJW-threatening (e.g., low vs. high suffering) experimental conditions (e.g., Callan, Powell, & 
Ellard, 2007; Burczyk & Standing, 1989; Correia & Vala, 2003). 
 What might account for this propensity for observers to evaluate victims positively? 
One possibility is that character judgements are colored by social norms and values 
prescribing positive reactions toward innocent victims, and proscribing negative reactions. 
Social convention holds that it is wrong to derogate a person for suffering brought about 
through no fault of their own, and a person doing so publically risks being seen as uncaring, 
vindictive, or irrational by others. Instead, many instances of undeserved suffering elicit 
expressions of sympathy (Feather, 2006; Weiner, 1995), and reactions of this kind appear to 
represent the normatively appropriate response toward innocent victims. Indeed, the 
notion that suffering should be met with sympathy and compassion is reflected by social 
institutions (e.g., organized religion, humanitarian organizations) and practices (e.g., 
charitable giving, sympathy cards), and responses of this character frequently occur in the 
RUNNING HEAD: Relative versus absolute  4  
 
 
 
wake of highly publicized tragedies (e.g., the 9/11 attacks; the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and 
tsunami).  
Presumably, via socialization, children learn how conventional rules determine the 
normatively appropriate response to one’s own and others (deserved and undeserved) 
outcomes (Lerner, 1987), including the appropriate emotional reactions (Feather, 2006; 
Saarni, 1999). For example, a child may be encouraged to respond with sympathy to a peer 
who is injured in the playground, or alternatively, they may be sanctioned for teasing a child 
who is physically disabled. Through experiences of this kind, then, people are taught that 
positive, other-regarding emotional expressions (e.g., sympathy, compassion) and behavior 
(e.g., helping, providing reassurance) represent the appropriate and socially normative 
response to others’ undeserved suffering and misfortune.  
That reactions to victims are often characterized by sympathy and compassion leads 
to the question of why, in some situations at least, people instead respond by derogating 
victims. Lerner (1998, 2003) proposes that this paradox can be explained by the operation of 
two distinct modes of processing and responding to injustice that are differentially engaged 
depending on contextual factors. One mode involves the automatic application of primitive 
causal schemas, acquired in early childhood, comprised of simple univalent associations 
between people and outcomes (e.g., “bad things happen to bad people”). At other times, 
however, people’s reactions will instead follow from a relatively dispassionate, thoughtful 
and conscious appraisal of the circumstances, which obeys conventional rules for assigning 
blame and deserving. Deliberation over the causal antecedents of suffering (external 
circumstances vs. the victim’s behavior) triggers attributions of responsibility (blamelessness 
vs. blameworthiness of the victim), which serve, in turn, to elicit the normatively 
appropriate emotional reactions (sympathy vs. anger or schadenfreude; Feather, 2006; 
Weiner, 1993, 1995).  
Conformity to social norms should result in relatively favorable character judgments 
insofar as these norms dictate that people should act in a generally positive manner toward 
innocent victims, such as by saying positive things about them and refraining from blame or 
criticism. Irrespective of any underlying motivation to derogate, people might thus respond 
in overtly positive terms because they do not want to appear deviant or irrational, perhaps 
to themselves as well as to others (Lerner, 2003). This suggestion echoes research showing 
that the expression of prejudice mirrors prevailing social norms regarding the acceptability 
of prejudiced attitudes (e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 
2001). The extent to which prejudice is overtly expressed depends upon the normative 
acceptability of doing so toward a particular target, and in a given context, as well as 
personal standards regarding the acceptability of prejudice (for a review, see Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003). The same or similar mechanisms may play a role in regulating how people 
respond toward innocent victims.   
Research in the domain of prejudice highlights that, although overt behavior toward 
a given social (e.g., ethnic) group may comply with social norms, a person’s private attitudes 
need not coincide. People may simply refrain from publicly expressing privately held 
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prejudices when doing so would violate social norms. In subtle prejudice, for example, 
people overtly comply with anti-prejudice social norms and avoid expressing negative 
attitudes toward minority groups, but subtle, covert expressions of prejudice still emerge in 
ambiguous situations because these norms are not mirrored by private attitudes (Meertens 
& Pettigrew, 1997). As an example, a person holding negative attitudes towards people with 
disabilities might support segregated schooling for disabled children, masked by the 
seemingly positive justification that segregation allows for a higher quality education for 
children with special educational needs (Deal, 2007). To complicate matters further, people 
can also hold personal standards or values that motivate them to conceal their underlying 
prejudices from themselves as well as others (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Devine 
& Monteith, 1993; Dunton & Fazio, 1997).  
We suggest that a similar state of affairs might hold for people’s reactions to 
innocent victims. Social norms or personal standards proscribing negativity toward victims 
might discourage observers from openly expressing negative character judgments, even if 
they privately hold these views. Following this reasoning, derogation of an innocent victim 
should be more evident in contexts where normative pressures are reduced or when 
researchers employ forms of measurement that are less susceptible to socially desirable 
responding. 
 
Relative and Absolute Measures 
 
Self-report measures (e.g., Likert-type scales, semantic differentials) typically require 
respondents to make evaluative judgments (e.g., of attitudes, personality traits, 
performance) about the self, other persons, or groups in strictly absolute terms. For 
example, respondents may be asked to indicate the strength of an attitude on a scale 
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, or to locate another person along a bipolar 
trait dimension such as very friendly to very unfriendly. Relative ratings, on the other hand, 
require evaluative judgments to be made in comparison to other individuals or groups 
(Goffin & Olson, 2011). Respondents may be asked to indicate whether a target person 
ranks higher or lower on some attribute (e.g., intelligence) than another person (e.g., the 
self), or the extent to which they endorse an attitude (e.g., “exams are stressful”) compared 
to a relevant reference group (e.g., “the average student”).  
We suggest that, when absolute and relative measures are employed in the same 
context, they may potentially paint different pictures of people’s underlying motivation to 
derogate victims. Our reasoning revolves around the role of social norms and personal 
standards in shaping overt reactions toward victims, as discussed earlier. Specifically, 
relative compared to absolute measures are perhaps less susceptible to the influence of 
social norms or personal standards that compel respondents to evaluate victims positively, 
in turn muting victim derogation. To illustrate why this may be so, consider the following 
example. A person is asked to rate their overall impression of Sarah, a hit-and-run victim, on 
an 11-point scale anchored from 1 = Very negatively, through 6 = Neither negatively nor 
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positively, to 11 = Very positively. Insofar as social norms mandate positivity toward 
innocent victims, a response at (and certainly below) the scale midpoint is inappropriate. 
Given the anchoring of the scale, such a response unambiguously entails an absence of 
positive feelings toward the victim. Rather, social norms entail that responses should fall 
more toward the positive end of the scale.  
Now consider that the same person is asked to rate their overall impression of Sarah 
on an 11-point relative scale that is anchored from 1 = Much more negatively than me, 
through 6 = The same as me, to 11 = Much more positively than me. What, for a naïve 
outside observer, does a response at the scale midpoint suggest about the judge’s 
underlying feelings toward Sarah? The person’s true feelings towards Sarah are ambiguous 
insofar as the judge’s self-evaluation, the reference point from which the victim is 
evaluated, remains unknown. A response at the midpoint could reflect either positive or 
negative feelings toward the victim, but the valence and extent of those feelings cannot be 
reliably determined without knowledge of the judge’s feelings about themselves. Hence, 
when Sarah is evaluated on the relative scale, responses at or close to the midpoint are not 
clearly unsympathetic and counter-normative.  
In sum, we suggest that, because relative measures render underlying evaluations of 
a victim more ambiguous, they may allow for victim derogation to emerge without 
transparently violating social norms or personal standards that prohibit negative reactions 
toward victims. In a similar way that implicit measures often suggest that underlying 
prejudice is higher than do explicit self-reports (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Dunton 
& Fazio, 1997), relative measures may reveal that the underlying motivation to derogate an 
innocent victim is stronger than is suggested by absolute measures in the same context.  
 
The Current Research 
 
We investigated the role played by absolute versus relative ratings, and social norms, 
in victim derogation across five studies. In Study 1, we examined whether the normative 
acceptability of expressing negative feelings toward victims is related to the evaluations that 
victims and other social groups receive. In Studies 2a and 2b, we investigated whether scale 
type (i.e., absolute versus relative) affected the extent of victim derogation for an innocent 
victim (i.e., high just world threat) versus a non-innocent victim (i.e., low just world threat). 
In Study 3, we followed up our Study 2 findings by using an alternative manipulation 
(fortunate vs. unfortunate outcomes). Finally, in Study 4, we investigated whether the 
motivation to avoid negative reactions toward victims modulates differences between 
absolute and relative measures of an innocent victim’s character.  
 
Study 1  
 
Although we suggested that it is counter-normative to derogate victims, to our knowledge 
no previous research has directly examined prescriptive social norms regarding reactions 
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toward victims. To address this, in Study 1 we asked participants about the normative 
acceptability of expressing negative feelings toward different victim (and non-victim) 
groups. Relatedly, research has shown that the extent to which negative feelings are 
expressed toward a given social group is strongly related to the normative acceptability of 
doing so, underscoring that social norms play a powerful role in regulating the expression of 
prejudice (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). Our reasoning suggests that social norms 
play an equivalent role in regulating the expression of victim derogation. Hence, we 
examined the idea that normative acceptability is negatively related to the evaluations that 
victims and other groups receive.  
 
Method 
 
Participants.  Participants (N = 83; 47% female; Mage = 34.2) were residents of the 
United Kingdom recruited online via Prolific Academic (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat & Acquisti, 
2016).1 
 
Materials.  The complete materials for all studies are available in the online 
supplementary material. The Study 1 materials and procedure closely mirrored those used 
by Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien (2002, Study 1). First, we adapted the list of 105 social 
groups used by Crandall et al. to better suit our purposes. A number of groups were 
dropped completely from the list either because (a) they were somewhat outdated and may 
not have been recognized (e.g., Guests on Ricki Lake), or (b) they were deemed not relevant 
to participants in the UK (e.g., Members of the National Rifle Association). Several others 
were replaced with similar groups that were deemed more relevant to participants in the 
UK (e.g., Hispanics was replaced with Eastern Europeans). We then added 6 victim groups to 
the list, namely, cancer patients, assault victims, victims of freak accidents, hit and run 
victims, robbery victims, and people suffering infectious diseases. A seventh victim group, 
people with AIDS, was already contained in the original list generated by Crandall et al. and 
was retained. The final list, then, was comprised of 100 groups, 7 of which were differing 
categories of victim. We aimed to use victim groups that were representative of those 
typically used in experimental research on victim derogation. Note, however, that a number 
of additional groups contained in Crandall et al.’s (2002) stimuli, and which were retained, 
can also be considered victims insofar as they are construed as suffering undeservedly (e.g., 
people who are blind). Alternatively, these groups might be considered as qualitatively 
distinct from other victims, insofar as they could involve disabilities that a person is born 
with, and such persons may not consider themselves to be victims. This ambiguity 
underscores the inherent “fuzziness” of the victim concept–who is considered to be a 
“victim” likely varies across people and contexts.  
   
                                                          
1 We did not request participants’ race/ethnicity. Descriptions of the relevant participant pool compositions 
are available in Peer et al. (2016) for Study 1, and in Buhrmester et al. (2011) for Studies 2-4.   
RUNNING HEAD: Relative versus absolute  8  
 
 
 
Procedure.  Participants first rated the “normative acceptability of expressing 
negative feelings” toward each of the 100 groups (1 = Definitely not OK to express negative 
feelings about this group; 5 = Definitely OK to express negative feelings about this group). 
The presentation order of groups was fully randomized across participants, who were 
additionally instructed that their responses should reflect what people generally agree is 
acceptable rather than their own personal opinions.  
 On a separate page, participants rated their personal feelings toward each of the 100 
groups using feeling thermometers (0 = Cold/Not positive; 100 = Hot/Very positive). The 
order of groups was again fully randomized across participants. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1 shows the 100 groups ordered by mean normative acceptability scores. All seven 
victim groups were rated below the scale midpoint (all ps < .001), indicating that 
participants believed it is socially unacceptable to express negative feelings toward any of 
the victim groups included. Averaging across all seven, victims in general were ranked as the 
8th least acceptable group (of 94) to express negativity toward (M = 1.47, SD = 0.66), and 
evoked warm feelings (M = 72.33, SD = 18.81). 
 We then calculated the mean normative acceptability ratings and feeling 
thermometer scores, collapsed across participants, for each of the 100 groups. Treating the 
groups as individual observations, the correlation between mean normative acceptability 
ratings and feelings was r = -.97, 95% CI [-.95, -.98], indicating that the extent to which 
participants expressed negativity toward any given group was very strongly related to the 
normative acceptability of doing so. This relation also held true for victim groups at the 
participant-level observations; collapsing across the seven victim groups, the correlation 
between normative acceptability ratings (α = .85) and feelings toward victims (α = .92) was r 
= -.36, 95% CI [-.14, -.55]. 
 The Study 1 findings underscore that social norms proscribe the expression of 
negative feelings toward various types of victims. Echoing previous findings showing that 
the expression of prejudice mirrors prevailing social norms (Crandall et al., 2002), less 
(more) acceptable targets of negative feelings evoked more (less) positive feelings, and this 
was the case for social groups in general, as well as victims specifically. To the extent that 
people are chronically or situationally motivated to follow social norms when evaluating a 
victim, then, they presumably ought to avoid openly engaging in victim derogation.     
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Normative 
acceptability Feelings Social group (cont.) (cont.) (cont.) (cont.) (cont.) (cont.) 
         
         
1.18 (0.59) 77.78 (23.77) Cancer patients* 1.98 (1.09) 68.49 (22.20) Manual laborers 3.12 (1.18) 36.00 (23.45) Porn stars 
1.19 (0.48) 74.45 (24.04) Blind people 1.99 (1.10) 57.41 (21.16) People who are illiterate 3.13 (1.35) 35.77 (24.84) Smokers 
1.30 (0.68) 76.14 (24.15) Paralympic athletes 2.00 (1.15) 64.96 (28.31) Eastern Europeans 3.14 (1.37) 37.35 (21.43) Ultra-thin fashion models 
1.30 (0.66) 75.31 (23.29) Deaf people 2.02 (1.19) 46.55 (22.81) People with open sores 3.18 (1.38) 35.33 (23.25) Debt collectors 
1.34 (0.77) 76.20 (22.52) Assault victims* 2.06 (1.18) 69.77 (25.56) People from the north of England 3.23 (1.24) 39.62 (19.10) Students who rarely study 
1.35 (0.71) 73.00 (22.60) Victims of freak accidents* 2.08 (1.15) 59.18 (24.49) Homeless people 3.23 (1.36) 25.19 (19.38) Members of religious cults 
1.39 (0.71) 72.01 (24.21) Mentally disabled people 2.11 (1.27) 69.57 (24.86) Cat owners 3.27 (1.28) 28.21 (22.91) Men who go to prostitutes 
1.41 (0.77) 80.57 (21.74) Firefighters 2.16 (1.23) 75.37 (21.93) Doctors 3.36 (1.39) 31.04 (19.00) Door to door salesmen 
1.44 (0.82) 72.81 (24.07) Mixed race couples 2.17 (1.09) 63.65 (23.77) Farmers 3.36 (1.32) 25.65 (24.18) Members of UKIP† 
1.46 (1.00) 77.75 (21.64) Hit and run victims* 2.20 (1.18) 57.81 (22.70) People from Essex 3.41 (1.19) 27.45 (20.59) Youth offenders 
1.47 (0.87) 66.71 (27.79) Army veterans 2.24 (1.26) 58.41 (25.71) Feminists 3.46 (1.27) 35.33 (21.15) Lazy people 
1.50 (0.84) 67.91 (24.89) Mentally ill people 2.28 (1.26) 62.88 (27.55) Police officers 3.49 (1.37) 27.77 (25.05) Drug users 
1.52 (0.90) 73.40 (25.80) Black people 2.29 (1.24) 67.20 (23.00) University students 3.58 (1.13) 21.71 (21.40) Men who leave their families 
1.53 (0.83) 69.31 (27.61) Gay soldiers 2.29 (1.12) 63.66 (25.01) Environmentalists 3.64 (1.20) 28.24 (26.45) People who sell cannabis 
1.53 (0.90) 68.65 (26.37) Jews 2.31 (1.28) 52.43 (22.57) Pub darts players 3.65 (1.39) 22.25 (26.04) Members of the BNP†† 
1.58 (0.95) 70.24 (25.79) Asians 2.32 (1.21) 61.55 (23.68) Civil servants 3.71 (1.20) 33.30 (22.54) Politicians 
1.60 (1.03) 73.29 (22.79) Robbery victims* 2.32 (1.29) 55.76 (24.28) Folk music fans 3.78 (1.26) 22.15 (24.29) Pregnant women who drink alcohol 
1.60 (0.91) 65.25 (27.81) Buddhists 2.35 (1.24) 64.10 (24.22) College students 3.84 (1.14) 22.47 (19.84) People who cheat on exams 
1.61 (0.94) 63.45 (25.59) People with AIDS* 2.39 (1.28) 61.73 (21.48) Car mechanics 3.87 (1.12) 19.55 (16.30) Kids who steal other kids lunch money 
1.64 (0.89) 70.38 (26.52) Elderly people 2.42 (1.26) 59.77 (23.43) Accountants 3.88 (1.06) 21.24 (18.85) People who litter 
1.69 (1.02) 77.20 (23.04) Male nurses 2.45 (1.26) 52.78 (24.21) Fat people 3.89 (1.22) 21.43 (16.25) People who cut in line 
1.71 (1.13) 70.34 (28.56) Gay people who raise children 2.45 (1.22) 47.96 (21.43) Beauty contestants 3.95 (0.99) 20.38 (19.51) Liars 
1.76 (0.93) 62.93 (23.64) People on disability benefits 2.46 (1.20) 51.00 (22.42) Benefits claimants 3.98 (1.10) 22.47 (19.84) People who cheat on their partners 
1.76 (1.03) 61.42 (25.35) Ugly people 2.66 (1.37) 33.64 (24.80) Jehovah’s witnesses 3.98 (1.15) 14.32 (19.17) Negligent parents 
1.80 (1.03) 74.51 (23.31) Business women 2.73 (1.40) 57.27 (24.80) Lawyers 4.01 (1.08) 17.78 (19.32) Men who refuse to pay child support 
1.80 (1.13) 73.82 (23.42) Canadians 2.76 (1.24) 41.35 (21.50) Ex-prisoners 4.05 (1.13) 15.96 (20.94) Gang members 
1.86 (1.03) 69.59 (21.88) Housewives 2.79 (1.42) 36.70 (25.46) Male prostitutes 4.12 (1.17) 16.14 (20.02) Careless drivers 
1.87 (1.16) 55.95 (22.68) People suffering infectious diseases* 2.84 (1.38) 38.60 (24.45) Female prostitutes 4.36 (1.13) 8.73 (19.16) Racists 
1.87 (0.91) 58.65 (21.17) People who put their kids in day-care 2.93 (1.36) 41.09 (28.42) Illegal immigrants 4.56 (0.85) 6.22 (19.60) Terrorists 
1.92 (1.13) 69.46 (22.91) Charity workers 2.94 (1.27) 33.35 (23.19) Alcoholics 4.60 (0.84) 5.97 (16.51) Wife beaters 
1.95 (1.24) 70.31 (25.94) White people 3.02 (1.41) 39.42 (27.59) Brexit voters 4.60 (0.92) 5.07 (18.05) Pedophiles 
1.95 (1.11) 68.32 (23.83) Librarians 3.08 (1.15) 33.79 (21.84) People who smell bad 4.63 (0.87) 5.20 (18.95) Rapists 
1.95 (1.19) 53.84 (27.87) Catholics 3.11 (1.13) 34.59 (20.91 Gamblers 4.66 (0.79 6.70 (16.78) Drunk drivers 
  
  
  
  4.69 (0.83) 5.60 (18.20) Child abusers 
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Table 1. Mean (SD) normative acceptability of expressing negative feelings toward, and feelings toward, 100 social groups
Note. Victim groups*. Higher Scores = greater normative acceptability of expressing negative attitudes. † United Kingdom Independence Party. †† British National Party.  
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Studies 2a and 2b 
 
In Studies 2a and 2b, we examined whether evaluations of an innocent (vs. non-innocent) 
victim’s character vary depending on the type of response scale used (relative vs. absolute). 
Although observers tend to rate non-innocent victims unfavorably, this does not represent 
victim derogation motivated by a concern for justice per se, but simply reflects that victims 
are held responsible for suffering brought about by their own actions, in accordance with 
normative rules for assigning blame and deserving (Hafer & Begue, 2005). Because negative 
reactions are normative and easily justified when a victim’s suffering is deserved, our 
reasoning suggests that little or no difference is to be expected between relative and 
absolute ratings for non-innocent victims. Insofar as participants use victim derogation to 
restore a perception of deservingness when exposed to an innocent victim, however, our 
reasoning suggests that relative compared to absolute measures will facilitate higher levels 
of victim derogation. Hence varying the innocence of the victim allowed us to test whether 
relative and absolute ratings differ, and crucially, whether they differ only under conditions 
in which, from just-world theory, derogation would be expected to occur—that is, when the 
victim is innocent (Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2009; Correia & Vala, 2003; Harvey, Callan, & 
Matthews, 2014). 
Studies 2a and 2b were identical with the exception of the comparison target used 
for the relative scales (victim compared to the average university student/the self, 
respectively). We employed different comparison targets across the two studies to ascertain 
whether results depended upon the particular referent employed in relative ratings.   
 
Method  
 
Participants. Participants in Studies 2a (N = 200; 46% female; Mage = 33.9) and 2b (N 
= 207; 42% female; Mage = 34.33) were from the United States and recruited online via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011). A further 28 participants 
in Study 2a, and 18 in Study 2b, were excluded for duplicate IP addresses or incorrectly 
answering a scenario comprehension check. The required sample sizes were set ahead of 
data collection (but were not completely predetermined due to removals and slight over-
recruitment), and power analyses showed that we had 80% power to detect “medium” 
effect sizes (f = .20, α = .05) for Studies 2a and 2b. 
 
Materials and procedure.  In both Studies 2a and 2b, participants were presented 
with a brief, ostensibly real news excerpt describing an incident where a male university 
student, called James, was injured after being hit by a car while attempting to cross the 
street (Callan, Dawtry & Olson, 2012). Half the participants were told that James “was 
crossing the road and the ‘walk’ sign was illuminated when he was struck by a driver going 
through a red light” (innocent victim). The remaining participants learned that James “was 
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crossing the road and the ‘do not walk’ sign was illuminated when he was struck by a driver 
going through a green light” (non-innocent). 
 Participants then responded to three separate items regarding their impression of 
James’s character. Half of the participants in both Studies 2a and 2b rated James’s character 
on absolute scales. These participants were asked to “Please rate James in terms of how 
careless/irresponsible/foolish he is as a person” (0 = not at all careless/irresponsible/foolish 
to 100 = a great deal careless/irresponsible/foolish; rescored 1-11 for analysis across 
measures and studies).  
In Study 2a, the remaining participants were presented with the same three 
questions, but in relation to the average university student. That is, participants were asked 
“Please rate James in terms of how careless/irresponsible/foolish he is as a person 
compared to the average university student” (0 = not at all careless/irresponsible/foolish 
compared to the average university student to 100 = a great deal 
careless/irresponsible/foolish compared to the average university student).  
In Study 2b, the remaining participants were presented with the same three 
questions in relation to themselves. Participants were asked “Please rate James in terms of 
how careless/irresponsible/foolish he is as a person compared to how 
careless/irresponsible/foolish you are as a person” (0 = not at all 
careless/irresponsible/foolish compared to me to 100 = a great deal 
careless/irresponsible/foolish compared to me). 
A value of 50 on the relative scales corresponded to a judgment that James was 
“about the same” as the average university student/me. The items were averaged, 
separately in Studies 2a and 2b, to form composite absolute and relative measures of victim 
derogation. The measures achieved good internal consistency in both Studies 2a and 2b (all 
αs > .98).  
In both Studies 2a and 2b, immediately following the relative or absolute character 
rating items, participants responded to an open-ended question in which they were 
requested to “…provide a few sentences about how you answered these questions.” 
Following Olson, Goffin, and Haynes (2007), participants were asked “How did you come up 
with your answers? What thoughts went through your mind? Why did you choose the 
responses you did?” Finally, participants in both studies answered a manipulation check (“I 
feel what happened to James is”; 1 = Slightly unfair to 7 = A great deal unfair) and an 
attention check (“In the news story you read, did the driver that hit James run a red light?”; 
Yes, No, Can’t remember, Didn’t say) before providing demographic information. 
 
Results  
 
Manipulation checks.  Confirming the success of the innocence manipulation, 
participants in Study 2a perceived the event as more unfair when James was innocent (M = 
5.75, SD = 1.84) than when he was non-innocent (M = 2.88, SD = 1.68), t(194.91) = 11.48, p < 
.001 (here and throughout, degrees of freedom were Welch-corrected where applicable; 
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see Delacre, Lakens, & Leys,in press). Similarly, participants in Study 2b rated the situation 
as more unfair when James was innocent (M = 6.00, SD = 1.54) than non-innocent (M = 2.77, 
SD = 1.53), t(203.92) = 15.11, p < .001.  
 
Ratings of the victim’s character. In Study 2a, a 2 (innocence: innocent vs. non 
innocent) by 2 (scale type: absolute vs. relative) between-subjects ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for victim innocence, with participants rating the victim more 
negatively when he was not innocent than when he was innocent, F(1, 196) = 434.51, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .689. There was also a significant interaction between victim innocence and scale 
type, F(1, 196) = 17.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .084 (see Table 2). Follow-up t-tests revealed that 
when the victim was innocent, participants who responded in relative terms (compared to 
the average university student) rated James more negatively than participants who 
responded in absolute terms, t(96.56) = 3.43, p < .001, d = 0.68, 95% CI of d [0.27, 1.07]. This 
pattern was reversed when the victim was non-innocent, t(78.72) = -2.45, p = .017, d = -
0.51, 95% CI of d [-0.91, -0.10].  
In Study 2b, there was a significant main effect for victim innocence, with 
participants devaluing the victim more when he was not innocent than when he was 
innocent, F(1, 203) = 283.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .582. There was also a significant main effect of 
scale type, with participants rating the victim more negatively when responding in relative 
(compared to the self) versus absolute terms, F(1, 203) = 18.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .084. These 
main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 203) = 7.97, p = .005, ηp2 = .038 
(see Figure 2). Follow-up tests revealed that when presented with the suffering of an 
innocent victim, participants who responded in relative (vs. absolute) terms rated the victim 
more negatively, t(96.21) = 4.13, p < .001, d = 0.82, 95% CI of d [0.41, 1.22]. When the victim 
was non-innocent, there was no significant difference between type of ratings, t(97.67) = 
1.43, p = .16, d = 0.28, 95% CI of d [-.10, 0.66].  
Taken together, the results of Study 2a and 2b demonstrated that participants rated 
the victim’s character more negatively when their ratings were made in relative versus 
absolute terms but only when the victim was innocent.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 An analysis of the data standardized within and collated across Studies 2a and 2b found that the Innocence X 
Rating Type interaction, F(1, 399) = 24.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .057, did not differ significantly by rating type (i.e., 
there was no significant three-way interaction), F(1, 399) = 0.46, p = .50, ηp2 = .001. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Studies 2a and 2b  
  Victim Innocence 
Rating Type Innocent Non-Innocent 
  M SD 95% CI of M M SD 95% CI of M 
Study 2a             
Relative 3.79 2.39 [3.14, 4.44] 8.31 1.82 [7.77, 8.85] 
Absolute 2.31 1.95 [1.76, 2.86] 9.13 1.39 [8.77, 9.49] 
              
              
Study 2b             
Relative 5.41 2.28 [4.83, 5.99] 9.04 1.64 [8.58, 9.50] 
Absolute 3.15 2.57 [2.41, 3.89] 8.62 1.32 [8.25, 8.99] 
              
 
Explanations for ratings of the victim’s character. Similar to Olson et al. (2007), 
participants in both studies were requested to write a few sentences about how they 
responded to the relative or absolute ratings of the victim’s character. Our primary interest 
was the extent to which relative compared to absolute rating scales induced participants to 
draw social comparisons when evaluating the victim. We adopted a two-category coding 
scheme: comparisons vs. attributions. Specifically, we coded (0 = No, 1 = Yes) whether each 
response made at least one reference to social comparison information (e.g., “He put 
himself in danger, something I would never do”; “He seemed less careful than peers his 
age”), and whether the response made at least one (non-comparative) attribution to the 
victim’s thoughts or actions (e.g., “He did everything as he should have”; “He should have 
been paying more attention”).  
The resulting counts of comparisons and attributions within the relative and 
absolute conditions are shown in Table 3. Although attributions were always more frequent, 
chi-square tests on both the Study 2a, χ2(1) = 32.22, p < .001, and Study 2b, χ2(1) = 54.18, p < 
.001 data, indicated that the ratio of social comparisons to attributions was significantly 
greater when participants responded using relative (vs. absolute) rating scales. Hence social 
comparisons were relatively more common amongst participants who rated the victim using 
relative compared to absolute rating scales. Notably, explanations for absolute ratings rarely 
mentioned social comparisons, underscoring that absolute ratings do not appear to provoke 
social comparisons like relative ratings do. 
 
Table 3. Frequencies of open-ended explanations of scale responses 
referring to attributions and social comparisons by study. 
 
 Ratings Study 2a Study 2b 
  Attributions Comparisons Attributions Comparisons 
Absolute 103 7 102 2 
Relative 74 45 63 51 
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Study 3  
 
In Studies 2a and 2b, relative scales produced more negative evaluations of the victim’s 
character than absolute scales only when the victim was innocent. More specifically, relative 
(vs. absolute) scales produced more negative evaluations of the victim under conditions 
where observers would be expected to derogate and where it was counter-normative to do 
so (i.e., under high just-world threat/when the victim was innocent). The interactions we 
observed suggest it is not the case that relative scales straightforwardly lead participants to 
necessarily select higher values in any given victimization context.  
One issue with these results is that because mean-levels of derogation in the non-
innocent condition approached the scale end-points in both Studies 2a and 2b, the observed 
interactions may have resulted from ceiling effects. That is, higher relative character ratings 
might conceivably have been observed, possibly reducing or mitigating the interactions, had 
the scales been able to capture any latent variance in derogation extending beyond the 
scale end-points.    
In Study 3, we sought to address this issue by using a different manipulation of just-
world threat. Specifically, participants read several scenarios that described otherwise 
“neutral” people either being the beneficiaries of a fortuitous positive outcome (low just-
world threat; cf. Callan, Kay, & Dawtry, 2014; Lerner, 1965), or the victims of a fortuitous 
negative outcome (high just-world threat), and rated the target persons in both relative and 
absolute terms. This design allowed us to examine whether the interactions observed in 
Studies 2a and 2b could be replicated in contexts where the person’s conduct was not 
objectively tied to his or her outcome (unlike the “non-innocent” James, who brought about 
his own suffering by jaywalking).  
 
Method 
 
Participants.  Participants from the US were recruited online via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (N = 209; 51.7% female; Mage = 38.6). Fifteen additional participants were 
excluded for incorrectly answering a scenario comprehension check. 
 
Materials and procedure. Study 3 used a 2 (Outcome: good vs. bad) x 2 (Rating Type: 
absolute vs. relative) fully-within subjects design. Participants read four brief scenarios 
describing two fortunate and two unfortunate events occurring to different people. The 
good outcome stories described: (a) a woman finding a box of antique coins or (b) a man 
making a large profit on the stock market. The bad outcome stories described, (a) a woman 
experiencing a cycling accident and mugging or (b) a man having an unsuccessful kidney 
transplant. 
Following each scenario, participants rated their “overall impression” of the target 
person on one absolute (e.g., “How negative-to-positive would you evaluate Thomas as a 
person”; 0 = Very negatively; 10 = Very positively) and one relative item (e.g., “How 
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negative-to-positive would you evaluate Thomas as a person compared to how negative-to-
positive you would evaluate yourself as a person”; 0 = Very negatively compared to me; 10 = 
Very positively compared to me; re-scored as 1 to 11 for analysis). Ratings were reverse 
scored so higher values indicated more negative evaluations of the targets. The ordering of 
scenarios and relative and absolute responses was fully randomized across participants. 
Finally, participants answered a simple attention check item: “What happened in the story 
you read about Barry flicking through a newspaper in the park” (1 of the possible 4 answers 
was correct).  
 
Results  
 
Participants’ ratings of the targets were fit with a linear mixed effects model using the lme4 
package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015, version 1.1-12) in R (R Core Team, 2015, 
version 3.3.2). The model included fixed effects for Outcome (good vs. bad, coded -0.5 and 
+0.5), Rating Type (absolute vs. relative, coded -0.5 and +0.5) and the Outcome X Rating 
Type interaction. We included random intercepts for participants and scenarios, and 
random slopes by participants for the effects of Outcome, Rating Type and the Outcome X 
Rating Type interaction (i.e., we allowed the main effects and the interaction to vary across 
participants, and random effects were correlated).3 To determine statistical significance of 
the fixed effects, we used Satterthwaite approximations to calculate p-values using the 
lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015) along with reporting 95% 
Wald confidence intervals.  
Shown in Figure 1, analyses revealed a significant main effect for Rating Type, b = 
1.05, se = 0.09, 95% Wald CI [0.87, 1.23]; t(211.70) = 11.54, p < .001, but not for Outcome, b 
= 0.44, se = 0.29, 95% Wald CI [-0.13, 1.00]; t(2.90) = 1.51, p = .23. More importantly, there 
was a significant Outcome X Rating Type interaction, b = 0.39, se = 0.138, 95% Wald CI [0.12, 
0.66]; t(643.10) = 2.83, p = .005.4 Follow-up analyses by refitting the model using dummy 
coding revealed that participants evaluated the targets more negatively using relative (vs. 
absolute) scales more strongly when the outcome was bad, b = 1.24, se = 0.12, 95% Wald CI 
[1.00, 1.48]; t(227.50) = 10.18, p < .001, than when the outcome was good, b = 0.85, se = 
0.10, 95% Wald CI [0.65, 1.06]; t(350.20) = 8.11, p < .001. Therefore, relative scales 
                                                          
3 A likelihood ratio test showed that a model including by-scenario random slopes for Rating Type did not 
produce a better fit than the simpler model, χ2 (2) = 0.95, p = .65 (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). Because each 
scenario was associated only with one type of outcome, we did not test a model including by-scenario random 
slopes for Outcome or the Outcome X Rating Type interaction.  
 
4 The same analyses but also including the order participants completed the relative and absolute scales 
(absolute first vs. relative first, coded +0.5 and -0.5) and the random slope by participants for the effect of 
order did not reveal a significant effect of order, b = -0.17, se = 0.11, 95% Wald CI [-0.35, 0.08]; t(184.30) = -
1.24, p = .22. 
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produced more derogation of the targets to a greater extent in response to bad (vs. good) 
outcomes.  
Interestingly, participants nonetheless rated the targets more negatively relative to 
the self even when the outcome was good. We speculate that social norms (such as norms 
of politeness; e.g., DeBono, Shmueli & Muraven, 2011) might entail that, where diagnostic 
information about a person is lacking, they should be given “the benefit of the doubt” and 
evaluated positively, thus producing favorable absolute ratings irrespective of the outcome 
a target experiences. Relatedly, people might evaluate any target less favorably relative to 
the self (or, conversely, evaluate the self favorably relative to any target) in most contexts 
because of self-enhancement (Brown, 1986; Krueger, 1998). 
To examine these possibilities empirically, we conducted a follow-up study with 
Mechanical Turk participants (N = 143; 51% female; Mage = 37.3; 19 additional participants 
were excluded due to duplicate IPs or failing a comprehension check) that was identical to 
Study 3, with two exceptions: First, the fortunate or unfortunate outcome information was 
removed, such that participants read only the first sentence describing the target person 
only (i.e., “Sarah is riding her bicycle home from work one day”; “Michelle is a metal 
detecting enthusiast”; “Thomas suffers from a rare disease of the kidneys”; Barry is sitting in 
the park during his lunch break”). Secondly, we included an additional measure in which the 
targets were judged relative to the average person from the social category they belonged 
to (e.g., “the average metal detecting enthusiast”). A one-way within-subjects ANOVA 
revealed that mean evaluations of the target differed across the three scale types, F(2, 284) 
= 52.67, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.27. Follow up tests revealed that absolute ratings (M = 4.93, SD = 
1.13) were less negative than relative-to-average ratings (M = 5.57, SD = 0.90), t(142) = 8.05, 
p < .001, d = 0.67, 95% CI’s [0.49, 0.85], which in turn did not significantly differ from 
relative-to-self ratings (M = 5.48, SD = 0.94), t(142) = 1.45, p = .13, d = 0.13, 95% CI’s [-0.04, 
0.29]. Absolute compared to relative ratings, then, were less negative even in the absence 
of any outcome information. This is not likely due to self-enhancement because relative 
ratings were always more negative, and similarly so, regardless of whether they did (i.e., 
when made relative to the self) or did not (i.e., when made relative to the average X) 
provide an opportunity to self-enhance.   
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Figure 1. The effect of outcome valence and scale type on derogation in Study 3. Error bars 
represent Cousineau-Morey 95% CIs (Baguley, 2012). 
 
Study 4  
 
Taken together, the findings of Studies 2a, 2b and 3 suggest that relative ratings produced 
more negative evaluations of the victim (a) irrespective of the particular nature of the 
injustice, and (b) to a greater extent under conditions where participants are theoretically 
motivated to engage in derogation (i.e., under higher just-world threat; innocent victims, 
fortuitous bad outcomes).  
 We next turned our attention to one factor that might modulate this divergence 
between relative and absolute ratings; specifically, the role of sensitivity to social norms or 
personal values that proscribe derogating innocent victims. Drawing on research and 
theorizing in the domain of prejudice, we suggest that a motivation to comply with social 
norms or personal standards proscribing negativity toward victims may modulate the 
divergence between relative and absolute measures under conditions of high just-world 
threat.  
Crandall and Eshleman (2003) suggested that “raw” prejudice does not manifest 
directly in behavior—rather, its expression is moderated by contextual or individual factors 
(social norms, beliefs, values) which can lead to its suppression, and other factors which 
justify or otherwise allow prejudice to emerge, often in covert form. Individuals may 
suppress prejudice to publicly comply with anti-prejudice social norms, because they have 
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internalized these norms (e.g., Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham & Vaughn, 1994; Crandall, 
Eshleman & O’Brien, 2002), or similarly, because they possess personal values (e.g., 
egalitarianism, political liberalism) that proscribe prejudice (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988). People 
can be motivated to appear non-prejudiced to other people, themselves, or both, and the 
chronic motivation to suppress prejudice varies across individuals (Crandall, Eshleman & 
O’Brien, 2002; Dunton & Fazio, 1997). For example, Dunton and Fazio (1997) found that 
people who scored higher on their Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale 
(MCPRS) expressed less prejudice on explicit measures even when implicit measures 
revealed negativity toward black targets, whereas low scorers were consistent in their 
explicit and implicit evaluations. These findings underscore how suppression serves to 
restrain or prevent implicit prejudice from manifesting in overt responses and behavior.  
We suggest that suppression may also play a role in responses toward victims. Social 
norms prescribe that it is inappropriate to react negatively toward innocent victims (see 
Study 1), and negative reactions are likely to be seen as callous, irrational, and otherwise 
undesirable, potentially by the self as well as other persons. To the extent that people 
internalize or seek to comply with norms mandating sympathy toward victims, any 
underlying motivation to derogate is potentially suppressed in overt evaluations. 
Suppression also provides one possible explanation for the higher levels of derogation 
observed under BJW-threatening conditions with relative (vs. absolute) measures in Studies 
2a, 2b and 3. Specifically, because relative compared to absolute measures render 
respondents’ underlying attitudes toward the victim somewhat ambiguous to the self or any 
potential audience, they are perhaps less prone to suppression. We investigated this 
possibility in Study 4 by examining whether the effect of rating type on victim derogation is 
modulated by the motivation to avoid reacting negatively toward victims. 
 
Method 
 
Participants.  Participants from the US were recruited online via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (N =223; 51% female; Mage = 37.2). An additional 21 participants were 
excluded either for incorrectly answering an attention check item (n = 10; “please select 
strongly disagree”), incorrectly answering a scenario comprehension question (n = 9; 
described below), or having a duplicate IP address (n = 2). 
 
Materials and procedure.  Participants were recruited to take part in two 
(ostensibly) separate short surveys on “worldviews” and “impressions of different events 
and people”. They first completed an adapted version of Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) MCPRS 
questionnaire. The wording of items was adapted such that those referring explicitly to 
suppressing prejudice (MCPRS items 1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 14; e.g., “In today’s society it is 
important that one not be perceived as prejudiced in any manner”) referred instead to 
suppressing negative reactions toward victims (e.g., “In today’s society it is important that 
one not be perceived in any manner as thinking negatively about people who have faced 
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misfortune or ill-treatment”). Two MCPRS items (4 and 17) could not be suitably adapted 
and were not included. All remaining items retained their original wording. The 15 adapted 
MCPRS items exhibited good internal consistency (α = .87, M = 4.29, SD = 0.89).5 
Participants then read a brief scenario in which a young woman describes how she 
caught a severe virus while working in a care home, leading to a spell in hospital and severe 
disruption to her university studies (adapted from Harvey, Callan, & Matthews, 2014). 
Participants then rated their overall impression of the woman in both relative (“How 
negative-to-positive would you evaluate Jenny as a person compared to how negative-to-
positive you would evaluate the average university student”; 0 = Very negatively compared 
to the average student; 10 = Very positively compared to the average student) and absolute 
terms (“How negative-to-positive would you evaluate Jenny”; 0 = Very negatively; 10 = Very 
positively). Prior to analysis, all ratings were rescaled from 1-11 and reverse-scored such 
that higher values indicate more negative evaluations. The order of relative and absolute 
items was randomized across participants. Finally, participants answered a manipulation 
check (“In the blog post you read, was Jenny hospitalized due to her infection and, as a 
result, missed a lot of university”; Yes, No, I can’t remember, or It didn’t say). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We performed a multilevel analysis using the lme4 and lmerTest packages in R. Participants 
ratings were regressed onto scores on the MCPRS (mean-centered), Rating Type (absolute 
vs. relative, coded as -0.5 and +0.5) and the MCPRS X Rating Type interaction. We included 
random intercepts by participants.  
 Absolute and relative ratings of the victim were significantly correlated, r = .68, p < 
.001. Consistent with our previous studies, there was a significant main effect of Rating 
Type, such that participants evaluated the victim more negatively using relative vs. absolute 
scales, b = .70, se = 0.11, 95% Wald CI [0.49, 0.92]; t(221) = 6.51, p < .001 (See Figure 2). This 
main effect was qualified by a significant MCPRS X Rating Type interaction, b = .32, se = 0.12, 
95% Wald CI [0.49, 0.92]; t(221) = 2.58, p = .01. A model also including the effect of order of 
ratings revealed no significant effect of order, b = -0.21, se = .25, t(220) = -0.83, p = 40. 
Follow-up analyses to the interaction showed that the effect of relative vs. absolute 
ratings on derogation of the victim was stronger at higher MCPRS (+1 SD), b = .99, se = 0.12, 
95% Wald CI [0.68, 1.29]; t(221) = 6.42, p < .001, than at lower MCPRS (-1 SD), b = .42, se = 
0.15, 95% Wald CI [0.12, 0.72]; t(221) = 2.75, p = .006. To summarize, the Study 4 findings 
show that the effect of scale type varies as a function of the motivation to suppress negative 
reactions toward victims, such that absolute and relative ratings diverged to a greater 
extent amongst people higher in the motivation to avoid negative responses to victims. 
                                                          
5 This measure and the mean normative acceptability of expressing negative feelings toward a variety of victim 
groups (victims of rape, robbery, assault, fraud, viral infections, natural disasters, freak accidents and cyber-
crime; cf. Study 1) were significantly correlated (r = -.41, p < .001) in a separate validation study of the revised 
MCPRS using Mechanical Turk participants (N = 96, Mage = 36.46, 44% female). 
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Figure 2. The effect of relative vs. absolute ratings of the victim’s character at lower (-1 SD) and 
higher (+ 1 SD) levels of Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions (MCPRS) to victims. 
 
General Discussion 
 
We suggested that relative versus absolute measures are less susceptible to the influence of 
social norms or personal standards that inhibit the expression of negative reactions to 
innocent victims, and therefore can be expected to show more negative character ratings. 
We provided evidence for this line of reasoning across five studies. In Study 1, we found that 
social norms proscribe the expression of negative feelings toward innocent victims. 
Participants believed that it was normatively unacceptable to express negative feelings 
toward any of the victim groups we examined, and the evaluations which victim and non-
victim groups received were strongly related to social norms—normatively unacceptable 
targets of negativity, such as victims, received more favorable evaluations. Our Study 1 
findings, then, support the notion that evaluations of victims are related to social norms 
that proscribe negative reactions toward them. 
 In Studies 2a and 2b, evaluations of an accident victim made relative to either the 
average student (2a) or the self (2b) versus absolute ratings showed more derogation only 
under conditions where observers were theoretically motivated to engage in derogation, 
and where doing so would contravene social norms (i.e., under high just-world threat/when 
the victim was innocent). Study 3 partially replicated these results using an alternative 
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manipulation of just-world threat—specifically, bad (vs. good) fortuitous outcomes. The 
interactions we observed in Studies 2a, 2b and 3 show that relative scales do not simply lead 
participants to select higher values in any given context—under non-just world threatening 
conditions, relative ratings were either more favorable than absolute ratings (Study 2a), the 
same as absolute ratings (Study 2b), or less favorable but by a smaller margin than under 
just-world threatening conditions (Study 3). In Study 4, drawing on research and theorizing 
on prejudice suppression (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Dunton & Fazio, 1997), we 
found that the chronic motivation to comply with social norms and personal standards 
proscribing the expression of negative feelings toward victims modulated the difference 
between relative and absolute measures. 
 
Social Norms and the Justification and Suppression of Victim Derogation 
 
In Crandall and Eshleman’s (2003) Justification and Suppression Model (JSM), genuine 
prejudice does not occur in raw form, but is modified by processes of suppression and 
justification that, respectively, inhibit or facilitate the emergence of prejudice. Expressed 
prejudice hence depends on a combination of social, situational (e.g., social norms), and 
dispositional (e.g., beliefs and values) factors that discourage its expression, or which 
rationalize or disguise prejudice and allow for it to emerge in an indirect or covert form. For 
example, a person may suppress prejudice against black people in contexts where anti-
prejudice social norms are strong or salient (e.g., at a university; in interactions with Black 
people), but in a situation where norms are weaker or ambiguous (e.g., down the pub with 
mates) they might tell racially-loaded jokes or express support for discriminatory social 
policies (Crandall, Blanchard, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 
2002).  
A key implication of the JSM is that expressed and experienced prejudice are rarely, 
if ever, a veridical reflection of a person’s true, underlying prejudice, due to the moderating 
influence of suppression and justification. We suggest that the same logic applies to victim 
derogation. To the extent that people are influenced by social norms and personal 
standards that proscribe negative reactions toward innocent victims, derogation, as it is 
commonly measured (i.e., absolute self-report scales), is not an unambiguous, veridical 
reflection of the motivation to derogate. This interpretation is supported by our Study 4 
findings showing that the chronic tendency to suppress negative feelings toward victims 
diminishes absolute levels of derogation. That relative levels of derogation were not 
influenced in this way suggests that relative scales are less suppression-prone, and perhaps 
also indicates that participants were similarly motivated to derogate irrespective of the 
tendency to suppress. Relatedly, our findings in Studies 2a and 2b underscore that people 
are prone to evaluate victims in highly negative terms under conditions where it is 
normatively appropriate to do so—that is, when they are unambiguously responsible for 
their own suffering.  
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Relative Measures as Covering 
 
 Relative scales might be conceived as providing a form of psychological cover, 
allowing for the motivation to derogate the victim to be released in a disguised form that 
does not overtly conflict with social norms or personal standards. Covering has been 
described as “the process by which the underlying prejudice that motivates an emotion, 
behavior or cognition is obscured by focusing attention on a plausible alternative motivation 
that is socially or personally acceptable” (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, p. 428). Covering 
allows for the release of prejudice under the guise of neutral, socially acceptable or benignly 
motivated behavior, for example by attributing prejudiced behavior to the requirements of 
a social role, or to self-interested goals. Working as a police officer, for example, may 
provide cover for prejudice to emerge via the discriminatory use of stop and search powers, 
and personal preferences can be invoked to justify avoiding interaction with persons whom 
one is prejudiced against. Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and Mentzer (1979), for example, found 
that participants chose to avoid a physically disabled confederate more often when doing so 
was construed as a choice between seeing a different (vs. the same) movie in a different 
theatre. Presumably, the ambiguity as to whether the participant was deliberately avoiding 
the disabled person or indulging their personal preferences provided cover for their 
discriminatory behavior. 
 We suggested at the outset that relative measures render a person’s true feelings 
toward a victim ambiguous, but they might also provide cover for derogation by reframing 
the context and purpose of judgment. Making an unfavorable social comparison is perhaps 
less clearly transgressive of social norms than is providing an overtly negative, absolute 
evaluation of a victim, because comparisons need not be construed as serving an exclusively 
evaluative purpose. Rather, relative scales could be interpreted more in terms of describing 
the relationship between a target and comparison referent on some attribute, and less in 
terms of evaluating the target, per se. This ambiguity in framing could cover the motivation 
to derogate—unfavorable comparisons may be attributed to a motivation to accurately 
describe the relationship between the victim and comparison target on the attribute under 
consideration. If an individual were to be challenged regarding their unfavorable relative 
judgement, they could justify their evaluation by describing the victim as atypical of 
students, or by describing the self as particularly responsible compared to one’s peers. 
Relatedly, and in line with the findings of Olson et al. (2007), the verbal explanations 
participants gave for their scale responses in Studies 2a and 2b show that, whereas absolute 
responses were explained almost exclusively in terms of attributions toward the victim (e.g., 
“He was jaywalking and crossed in front of moving traffic which was stupid and careless”), 
relative responses were often explained in terms of social comparisons (e.g.,  “I answered 
the questions the way I did because I would never cross the road with a no walking sign”).  
  
Summary and Conclusions 
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 Akin to prejudice, social norms and personal standards proscribing negative 
reactions toward victims appear to mute the expression of victim derogation. In a similar 
manner that people suppress counter-normative prejudices, they may also suppress 
counter-normative reactions toward victims. We have speculated that relative measures 
provide a form of cover, allowing for victim derogation to manifest in an ambiguous and 
covert form that does not openly contravene social norms or personal standards regarding 
the appropriate treatment of victims. Relative measures may therefore provide a more 
accurate picture of the underlying motivation to derogate, than do absolute measures, 
insofar as they are less prone to the influence of these factors.  
  Future research should seek to more directly address how the properties of relative 
measures act to mitigate suppression. For example, do relative measures render a person’s 
true attitudes more ambiguous for other persons or the self, as we have argued? 
Furthermore, to what extent do relative measures mitigate suppression by obscuring the 
motivation to derogate from either the self or from other persons? The suppression of 
derogation may result from public compliance to social norms regarding the treatment of 
victims, from a personal motivation to treat victims in a fair, rational and sympathetic 
manner, or to some degree from either social pressures or personal motivations. 
The present findings echo research on “shifting standards” (Biernat, Manis & Nelson, 
1991) showing that judgments of orthogonal social categories (e.g., men vs. women) differ 
to a greater degree on objective (e.g., height in centimeters) than absolute measures (e.g., 
short/tall judgments). When judgments are anchored in stereotypes, for example “women 
are shorter than men”, subjective labels such as “average height” carry a different meaning 
for either group, and hence objective measures can reveal stereotyping effects that are 
attenuated on absolute measures. The phenomenon we examined, however, is conceptually 
and empirically distinct from shifting standards. Although non-innocent (versus innocent) 
victims are potentially stereotyped as more careless etc., our results do not conform to this 
model. Whereas shifting standards implies that absolute (relative) measures should 
converge (diverge) across innocent and non-innocent conditions, Studies 2a and 2b revealed 
the inverse trend.  
 A further issue concerns the role of the specific comparison referents employed in 
relative measures. Insofar as referents (e.g., the self, the average student) are evaluated 
differently, evaluations of a target should vary depending on the particular referent 
employed (Goffin & Olson, 2011). Goffin and Olson (2011) suggest that judgments will be 
influenced by raters’ familiarity with a referent, whether it is an individual or group, and in 
the latter case, its heterogeneity on the attribute assessed. Future research should seek to 
systematically examine the influence of these particular properties of comparison referents 
in the context of victim derogation.    
Finally, our reasoning suggests that the present findings should generalize to other 
contexts in which persons are motivated to express an attitude that is proscribed by social 
norms or personal standards. Future research could examine, for example, whether 
absolute and relative measures of racial prejudice differ depending on contextual norms or 
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personal values pertaining to the acceptability of prejudice. The present findings underscore 
that relative measures may be a useful tool in this domain, insofar as they are less 
suppression-prone than traditional self-report measures, and may have practical advantages 
over implicit measures of prejudice.     
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